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Our Beleaguered Public World
Anthony T. Kronman
A few weeks ago, I received a letter from a man-not himself a graduate of
the Yale Law School-condemning the president's behavior and his manipu-
lative use of the law to conceal it The letter writer said he held the Yale Law
School responsible. The art of evasive hairsplitting, the disrespect for truth,
the cynical view oflaw as a tool with no inherent dignity ofits own: all of these,
he said, the president must have learned atYale. What steps was I prepared to
take as dean, he asked, to produce graduates ofhigher ethical quality? It was
not the only such letter I have received.
I responded politely but brushed the criticism, and the question, aside.
How can the president's law school be held accountable for his failings, even
his failings as a lawyer? Most Yale graduates-most graduates of every law
school in the country-are morally minded men and women with a strong
sense ofprofessional duty. Most of them spend a great deal of time worrying
about ethical issues that others ignore. Most lawyers have a deep commitment
to the law, and to the civilization it supports, and the spirit ofpublic service is
alive amongst them. On the whole, our graduates are honorable men and
women, with an unusually resilient idealism and a greater-than-ordinary sensi-
tivity to the moral dilemmas of practical life. We should be proud of these
qualities in our graduates and, as their teachers, perhaps even take a little
credit for them. We should be at peace in our work, our schools, our selves.
Our enterprise is flourishing.
Indeed, one might wonder whether there has ever been a happier time in
American legal education. Have we ever had greater resources? Have we ever
enjoyed more respect among our colleagues in other departments? Have our
schools ever been livelier, or our students better prepared for the study oflaw?
Here and there, perhaps, the past may look a little brighter than the present,
and the present is of course imperfect. Each of our schools has room for
improvement. Each can be better than it is. But overall we are in great shape,
the best we have ever been in. How many ofus honestly wish our schools could
be as they were ten, or twenty, or fifty years ago? This is the golden age of
American law teaching, and we its lucky inhabitants.
.These are comforting thoughts, though you may suspect from the vehe-
mence with which I express them, that they give me less comfort than one
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might guess. That is a valid suspicion. My confidence conceals my doubts. For
however successful we may be in imparting to our students a durable sense of
professional ethics and a commitment to the public good, the public world for
which we are preparing them, and in which they are destined to spend their
professional' lives, is today in disrepair. The events of the last year have
brought the extent of this disrepair to light, and cast a shadow over our own
academic enterprise, which at the moment may glow with good health but
must eventually falter if the public world to which it is so intimately linked
becomes too badly deranged. This is the deeper concern that lies behind my
letter writer's complaint. It is a concern I share, which perhaps explains why I
have not been able to put his letter out ofmind.
Let me start with a familiar observation. The law is a public profession. Its
values are debated in the language ofjustice, the language of public reason,
and made real through the use of state-sponsored force. Every lawyer is a
representative of public order and always speaks on its behalf, even in the
most confidential conversation with a client. The world ofpublic things-the
res publica-is the environment in which lawyers do everything they do, and
outside it they have, strictly speaking, no professional existence at all (unlike
doctors, who would still have a function to perform even if the public world
were abolished-a fact that helps to explain why ancient writers, who placed a
supremely high value on civic participation, held doctors in such low esteem).
When the public world shrinks, or becomes polluted, the life ofour profession
is threatened, and our own work as law teachers put in question. At the limit,
the disappearance of the public world would put us all out 9fbusiness.
We are of course far from that limit today, but the only-semifacetious
suggestion that politics has become so unattractive that young people will
soon have to be drafted into it suggests we may be moving in this direction.
Our public world is shrinking, and the spectacle ofpartisan rancor, ofdestruc-
tive censoriousness on the one side and corrosive dishonesty on the other,
that has held our attention for a year, like some massive train wreck from
which we cannot avert our eyes, has produced a universal state of exhaustion
and disgust, and the widespreadjudgment that our public life is today in worse
shape than at any time in living memory. Ifthat is true-and I believe it is-the
danger for lawyers, and for us, is large.
It is natural to ask who is to blame for this. That is always the first question a
bad accident produces. My own view, for what it's worth, is that everyone who's
had a role to play in the Lewinsky Affair must bear some of the responsibility
for it-from Bill Clinton, whose reckless mendacity brought it on, to Ken
Starr, whose colossally bad judgment gave it life, to Henry Hyde, whose
timidity and partisanship transformed it into a genuine constitutional crisis.
This is a debatable view, and we can certainly argue about the relative degrees
of responsibility that different actors in the drama should bear. But let us save
that argument for another day. The damage is done, and the important thing
now is to see what can be learned from it about the character of American
public life at the end of the twentieth century.
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What the Lewinsky Affair points up, I believe, is the importance of three
conditions for a stable and healthy public life: first, a broadly shared under-
standing ofwhere to draw the line between what is public and what is private;
second, a broadly shared understanding ofthe meaning ofthe rule oflawand,
in particular, of the mix of impersonal norms and personal traits needed to
achieve it; and third, a broadly shared understanding of the value of institu-
tions, without whose durability and transcendence ofself-interest there can be
no public life at all.
The Lewinsky Affair shows us how weak these shared understandings have
become and underscores the effect their weakening has had on the world of
public affairs, the life-world of our profession. To restore them will require
more than an act of faith, or exercise ofwill. The shared understandings on
which a healthy public life depends must-if I may put it this way-be rea-
soned back into existence. Once they have been badly damaged, they can
grow again only from reasoned conviction. This is mainly an intellectual task,
and here, I believe, we law teachers can make a contribution. We are the legal
profession's intellectual specialists. Let us use our specialty to help restore the
shared understandings essential to our public world, the only world in which
lawyers can survive. This will not be easy, and I have no simple solutions to
propose. But I believe that success in this intellectual venture will do more
good for our graduates, and for the cause of professionalism generally, than
all the declarations of devotion to public service we can muster, and all the
novel methods of teaching legal ethics we can invent.
I have named three large topics. In the brief space I have, I can say only a
few words about each. First, let me comment on the vanishing line between
matters public and private. The philosopher Thomas Nagel has recently
reminded us, in an eloquent essay in Philosophy and Public Affairs, of the
importance ofpreserving a distinction between these two domains. Only ifwe
all agree that the details of our private lives-and of our sex lives in particu-
lar-are to be kept out of the public light, and not made a matter of open
discussion, is public life possible at all. The creation of a common civilization
depends upon our not knowing too much, or saying too much, about each
other's private lives. Without a significant measure of reticence and conceal-
ment, we would shock each other senseless. If all our lusts and hatreds were
revealed, we could not bear each other's company for a moment; our life in
common would collapse. By the same token, the revelation ofour most private
actions and habits would deprive us of the secret space in which to expose,
tentatively and in the company ofintimates, our most childish and passionate
longings. It would deprive us of the space in which to expose our awkward
humanity. If the line between the public and the private were erased, both
civility and humanity would perish.
This is conventional liberal wisdom. john Stuart Mill offered a classic
statement of it. What has undermined its authority? What has brought us to
our current situation, so powerfully exemplified by the Lewinsky Affair, in
which the line between the public and the private has for all practical pur-
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poses ceased to exist? Several ideas of different sorts, and appealing to differ-
ent constituencies, have converged to produce this result.
To begin with, there is the Rousseauist fantasy, so appealing to my genera-
tion thirtyyears ago and still powerful today, that the authentic man orwoman
is the one who'is prepared to let it all hang out. To be embarrassed about
one's private life, about one's fantasies and desires, is, on this view, to be a
slave to convention; freedom begins when we take off our clothes in public.
Today this idea has lost much ofthe force it possessed for its champions in the
1960s. We have grown up, put on our clothes, had children, bought homes,
and taken out mortgages. But it survives in the belief that we should not be
shocked or embarrassed when someone else lets it all hang out-or has it
hung out for him. Only this can explain the widespread acceptance ofpornog-
raphyin contemporaryAmerica, and the success of the mainstream culture of
soft-core titillation that is its second cousin. Only this can explain the relaxed
reception by the viewing public of the media's relentless exposure of the
"indiscretions" of our leading public figures-an easy acceptance of sexual
matters without which, of course, the media would have no one to whom
to pander.
To this idea from the left isjoined another ofa more conservative kind: the
idea that character is what really matters in politics, and that a person's
character is all of a piece, so that what an individual does in private reveals
traits that bear upon our assessment ofhis or her public persona. Every sin, on
this view, is a political blunder, and the effort to keep the realms ofprivate and
public life apart must be fought as an attempt to blind our politicaljudgment.
Yet another idea-familiar to all ofus here-has contributed to the efface-
ment of the line between public and private. This is the idea thatjustice must
be understood as a substantive and not merely formal ideal. "The law, in its
majesty, forbids the rich as well as the poor from sleeping under bridges at
night." We all recognize the sentiment this bitterly ironic maxim expresses.
Indeed, most of us accept it. But to accept it is to deny the validity of the
distinction between de jure and de facto. It is to acknowledge that the
distribution ofmaterial wealth, racial advantage, and gendered power all bear
upon the real justice of our public arrangements, whose fairness cannot be
assessed in formal terms alone. Once we accept this idea, however, much-
perhaps all-ofwhat happens in the realm ofprivate life (all the subtleties of
our racial and sexual attitudes, for example) becomes relevant to our public
debates about the justice ofvarious laws and institutions. The idea has many
expressions. It is the driving force behind the Freedom of Information Act
and Catharine MacKinnon's attack on pornography. It has contributed to the
acceptance of "hostile work environment" claims in the law of sexual harass-
ment. It is one of the great moral ideas ofour time.
Together all these forces have converged to make the line between our
public and private lives-a line that is essential to the -conventions on which
our civilization depends, and also to our ability to escape these conventions-
seem wavering and worthless: the decaying byproducts of the flower child's
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cult of authenticity; the new emphasis on the importance and wholeness of
character; the insistence that the personal is the political, a conviction strong
enough to overcome even the most resolute commitment to the protection of
privacy. Where, amidst all these ideas, shall we find the materials to recon-
struct a common understanding as to how the line between public and private
shall be drawn and defended? This is our first great challenge.
A second concerns the meaning of the rule of law. No ideal has been
invoked more often in the impeachment debate. It is the ideal to which both
sides subscribe, and for whose prestige they fight.
The president's critics charge that he lied under oath and thereby violated
one ofthe essential conditions ofthe rule oflaw: the requirement that anyone
formally sworn to tell the truth in a legal proceeding do so, even if the truth
means possible prosecution and certain embarrassment. To let an oath taker
be the judge ofwhether and to what extent his oath shall be respected is to
place him above the law; it is to substitute the rule ofmen for the rule oflaw.
Nothing could be more repugnant to oursystem ofgovernment, the president's
accusers insist, or clearer grounds for impeachment.
The president's defenders of course deny that he committed peIjury,
however incomplete and misleading his testimony may have been. But more
significantly, they also seek to capture back from their enemies the immense
authority associated with the ideal of the rule of law itself, the flag that
constitutes the great prize in this battle. They attempt to do this by arguing for
a wider conception of the rule of law, one that includes notions like propor-
tionality and prosecutorial discretion and that condemns the remorseless
pursuit of technical infractions by a politically motivated special prosecutor
armed with limitless resources as the destruction, not the vindication, of the
rule of law. The aim of this defense is to portray the president's attackers,
rather than the president himself, as the real threat to our legal system, and
their campaign against him, with its politicized use of the law, as the truly
dangerous step toward a rule ofmen.
This debate over the meaning ofthe rule oflaw, and the struggle to capture
its authority, will continue after the Lewinsky Affair is ended. But both sides
miss something important, which we must incorporate into our understand-
ing of the rule of law, whether we conceive it in the narrower way that Henry
Hyde does, or more expansively, as the president's supporters urge. The
president's attackers and defenders agree that the rule ofmen is an evil-the
supreme evil in a system of government devoted to the rule of law. How can
anyone object? The rule ofmen is tyranny, plain and simple. And yet I cannot
help thinking that one of the most remarkable features of this long and tiring
Affair has been the complete absence from the field of debate of men and
women who, to put it bluntly, possess some measure of personal greatness-
men and women of courage and vision, prepared to stand apart and risk self-
interest for the sake of a commitment to the rule of law-and I cannot help
thinking that their absence from the field has itselfbeen a serious blow to the
rule oflaw.
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Everywhere I look I see pettiness and fear. I see smallness ofsoul. I see it in
Henry Hyde's cowardly decision to release the Starr Report before his com-
mittee had even begun to deliberate. I see it in the partisan bickering of the
committee and the House. I see it in the Starr Report, which has not one
single paragraph ofgreatness in it. And I see it in the president, who may feel
himself to be the righteous victim of a witch-hunt, but who has insulted every
law-respecting American by cowardly refusing to trust the law to vindicate his
cause, however much embarrassment that might produce.
The rule oflaw requires occasional acts ofcourage in its defense. It requires
occasional acts ofself-sacrifice. When Sir Edward Coke addressedJames I, and
defended the rule oflaw against the personal authority ofkings, he gave us an
example we remember four centuries later. The example gives life to the ideal
and insures its survival. In this sense, one might say that the rule of law
depends upon the acts ofmen and women, as well as the machinery ofjustice.
It depends upon the quality of their characters and the strength of their souls.
This is not an invitation to tyranny. It is not the beginning of the rule ofmen.
It is, in fact, an essential condition ofrespect for law and fidelity to it. Nothing
in the Lewinsky Affair has done more, in my judgment, to compromise the
American people's tenacious faith in the rule of law than the pettiness and
cowardly self-interest with which this great ideal has been invoked by the
president's attackers and defenders alike. The smallness of their actions
makes the ideal itselflook small. This is a destructive and sad result. Surveying
the wreckage of the last year, one is bound to ask not only what norms and
practices the rule of law includes, but also what sort of men and women are
needed to secure it. That is a second subject on which it would be useful for us
to reflect.
Finally, let me say a word about the value ofinstitutions. This is something
we seem to have an increasingly difficult time protecting, or even understand-
ing. In our profession, for example, few law firms ofany size still command the
institutional loyalty they once did, or possess a moral and intellectual culture
their members believe worthy ofsupport, if it comes at some material cost to
themselves. Almost without exception, these firms have become collectives of
convenience, whose lawyers are held together only by self-interest, and come
and go without any regard for the cultural life of the institutions through
which they are passing. Something similar is happening in the legal academy.
The market for law teachers':"-accelerated by the ratings system in which we all
feel trapped like prisoners-now operates with such remorselessness that our
faculties have become unstable collectives of convenience too, in which the
idea ofloyalty to one's school is increasingly viewed either as childish folly or
as the self-serving faith ofthose who have no better opportunities. In the world
oflaw teaching, like that oflaw practice, institutional loyalty is dying.
This is in fact a general characteristic of our time, and the Lewinsky Affair
helps us to see just how weak institutional loyalty has become through the
whole range ofpublic life. It is said that things will be different in the Senate,
that proceedings there will be conducted with an eye to the long-term inter-
ests of the Senate as an institution, with respect for the constitutional ambition
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that the Senate be a council ofgreater deliberateness and disinterest than the
House. We shall see. But up to this point, at least, the participants in the
drama ha'Ve all acted with a reckless indifference to the welfare of the institu-
tions they represent, and have left their institutions badly weakened. The
presidency is covered in filth. The Office of Special Counsel has lost its
legitimacy and may soon be abolished, despite the good reasons for preserv-
ing itin a modified form. And the House ofRepresentatives looks like ajoke,
alternating between calls for independent judgment and responsiveness to
the popular will, and incapable of both. In each case this °has happened
because the people responsible for protecting these institutions have acted
from self-interest instead, and consistently placed their own welfare ahead of
the integrity of the offices they occupy. They have shown us what becomes of
the public world when the value ofinstitutions is no longer recognized in it.
How has this happened? That is a difficult question to answer. I suspect it
has something to do with the primacy ofeconomic relations, and ofeconomic
thin\<ing, in a post-Cold War world where the epic political battles of the
recent past are already nearly forgotten, and the appetites for profit and
consumption, unleashed by technology, now dominate the spirit of sacrifice
and subordination on which all institutions depend. But whatever the expla-
nation of our current condition, I am completely convinced of two things:
first, that there can be no public world without durable institutions, and
second, that there can,be no institutions without a shared understanding of
their value, an understanding sufficiently strong to motive self-sacrifice on
their behalf. In the deepest sense, the public world is nothing but a set of
institutions, whose transcendence of self-interest expresses the universal hu-
man longing to build something larger and more lasting than the transient
and isolating appetites of our separate selves. We have not lost this longing.
Thatwould be impossible. But we have lost the ability to recognize and honor
it, and we now view its expressions with the smirking irony of the sophisticate
who has learned to see through every pretense and finds nothing but self-
interest at the bottom of every gesture ofloyalty and trust.
But now I am speaking rhetorically, and what is needed is an argument. We
must fashion an argument clear enough to make the value of institutions
rationally compelling again. Nothing else will do. Without such an argument,
pleas for institutional loyalty will seem naive or perhaps even dangerous and
are bound to be unconvincing. But where shall we find the materials from
which to construct the argument that is needed?
Our public life is in disrepair. TheLewinsky Affair has made this plain. To
restore it to good health we need to recreate a broadly shared understanding
ofwhere to draw the line between public and private things; ofhow tojoin the
personal trait ofcourage with the impersonal rule oflaw; and ofwhy to believe
that institutions have value. In each case, this will require patient thought. But
thinking is our speciality, it is what we do for a living, and it does not seem
implausible to hope that by practicing our special discipline we can make a
contribution to the search for answers to these questions, a search in which
many others are engaged. This may be the most important contribution we
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can make to the restoration of our tattered public world, and because this
world is the only one in which law and lawyers can survive, it may be the most
important contribution we can make to the legal profession. Professional
responsibility demands actions as well as ideas. But at the present moment,
when the basic conditions of our public life are surrounded by such confu-
sion, it may be that our first duty is simply to think.
